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You had something to hide, should have hidden it shouldn’t you. Now
you’re not satisfied, with what you’re being put through. It’s just time
to pay the price, for not listening to advice, and deciding in your
youth on the Policy of Truth. Things could be so different now, it used
to be so civilized. You will always wonder how it could have been if
you’d only lied. It’s too late to change events it’s time to face the
consequence for delivering the proof in the Policy of Truth. Never
again is what you swore, the time before. Now you’re standing there
tongue tied, you’d better learn your lesson well, hide what you have
to hide, and tell what you have to tell. You’ll see your problems
multiplied, if you continually decide, to faithfully pursue the Policy
of Truth.- Policy of Truth by Depeche Mode. 1

INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years before Depeche Mode’s 1990 single, “Policy of
Truth,” the Khmer Rouge, under its leader Pol Pot, committed a
devastating genocide against the people of Cambodia. From 1975 to
1979, a period known then as Democratic Kampuchea, 2 the Khmer
Rouge savagely and brutally killed an estimated 1.5 million to 3 million
people. 3 Comparatively, in Rwanda, and four years after Depeche
Mode’s single, the Hutus killed more than 800,000 Rwandans over a

1. DEPECHE MODE, Policy of Truth, in VIOLATOR (Mute Records 1990)
[hereinafter Policy of Truth].
2. KHAMBOLY DY, A HISTORY OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (1975–1979) 1
(2007).
3. Henri Locard, State Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979) and
Retribution (1979-2004), 12(1) EUR. REV. HIST. 121, 121 (2005).
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100-day period in 1994. 4 The death toll constituted approximately 70%
to 80% of the Tutsi population, 5 and 33% of the Pygmy Batwa. 6
These tragic events in human history, similar in their senseless and
reprehensible killing of innocent people, generated different
mechanisms to address the devastation left behind by the respective
genocides. Cambodia created the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”), 7 a traditional and formal tribunal
system adhering to international law and jurisdiction. Conversely,
Rwanda opted for a community based, non-traditional format. In 2001,
the Rwandan government instituted the Gacaca court 8 to accommodate
the hundreds of thousands of people accused of acts of genocide and
crimes against humanity. 9 Additionally, the Gacaca was established
not only to convict and punish those responsible for the genocide, but
also as a tool of transitional justice to further community healing and
rebuilding. 10
Various sectors of the international community have recently
discussed the role of transitional justice to address these atrocities.
Transitional justice is a combination of judicial and non-judicial
measures used to combat systemic human rights atrocities. 11 Some
transitional justice methods include, criminal prosecutions, truth
commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional
4. See, e.g., Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, BBC NEWS, May 17, 2011,
at 1, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13431486.
5. PHILIP VERWIMP, A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF GENOCIDE IN KIBUYE
PREFECTURE 8 (2001).
6. See Raja Sheshadri, Pygmies in the Congo Basin and Conflict, ICE CASE
STUD. 163 (2005), http://mandalaprojects.com/ice/ice-cases/pygmy.htm.
7. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed
During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Cambodia-UN, June 6, 2003, 2329
U.N.T.S. 117; see also G.A. Res. 57/228, Khmer Rouge Trials, at 2–3 (May 22, 2003)
(approving the establishment of the ECCC).
8. Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as
Transitional Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 50 (2006) (Gacaca loosely translates into
“justice amongst the grass”).
9. Id. at 2.
10. See Mark Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to
Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1261 (2000).
11. What is Transitional Justice?, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST.,
https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
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reforms. 12 They can be seen in a variety of formations, from the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, 13 to the Good Friday
Agreement in Ireland, 14 and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 15
Transitional justice is implemented when a political system
transitions from a regime of violence and repression to a peaceful and
stable society. 16 However, transitional justice movements are directly
related to a society’s treatment during and after the regime change. 17
Transitional justice can serve to rebuild government trust, and repair
political systems that are severely damaged. Overall, these movements
“comprise[] the full range of processes and mechanisms” to attain a
more peaceful, certain, and democratic future. 18 As utopian as
transitional justice sounds for countries plagued with atrocities of
genocide and crimes against humanity, scholars and analysts have
raised concerns regarding its implementation. The most prevalent
criticism is directed at its most utilized and prominent form: trials.
Makau W. Mutua, a Kenyan-American legal scholar, commented
on the International Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and argued “the
Rwanda Tribunal, no matter how successful it becomes, will never
compensate for the inaction of the international community as the
genocide took place in 1994.” 19 Furthermore, former investigator for
the United Nations Security Council’s Commission of Experts on
Rwanda, Lyal S. Sunga, argues criminal prosecutions and truth
commissions, as currently established, are conflicting; thus, preventing
each other from properly carrying out their objectives. 20 Mr. Sunga

12. Id.
13. See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (S.
Afr.).
14. See Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, 37
I.L.M. 751.
15. S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
16. Lisa J. Laplante & Kelly Phenicie, Mediating Post-Conflict Dialogue: The
Media’s Role in Transitional Justice Processes, 93 MARQ. L. Rev. 251, 254 (2009).
17. See id. at 253.
18. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).
19. Makau Matua, Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda
Tribunals, 11 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 167, 183 (1997).
20. See Lyal S. Sunga, Ten Principles for Reconciling Truth Commissions and
Criminal Prosecutions, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
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argues truth commissions must be established under international
human rights and criminal law to avoid conflicting and undermining
criminal prosecutions by granting blanket amnesties to offenders of
serious crimes. 21 Instead, criminal prosecutions should be focused on
human rights victims, so the government’s actions are placed in a
proper perspective. 22
Given these concerns and critiques, the debate within transitional
justice revolves around what aspect to pursue initially: justice or
peace. 23 Those emphasizing justice assert that if those accused of
human rights violations are not prosecuted, the impunity for crimes will
transition into the incoming regime, thereby preventing a complete
transition away from the conflict. 24 However, those advocating for
peace assert the only way to efficiently end violence is through gaining
the truth via reconciliation and granting amnesties. 25 The stark reality
is that the method of transitional justice utilized is a subjective decision,
which varies from state to state. The sequence of implementing
transitional justice measures directly “depends on time and the
historical context of the conflict.” 26 Accordingly, Cambodia and
Rwanda have implemented different trial functions to implement
transitional justice. The international community can learn lessons
about both systems as well as other international tribunals by comparing
these two different examples of transitional justice measures.
This Comment attempts to understand the positive and negative
impacts both systems have had in forwarding transition justice. Part I
of this Comment analyzes the Gacaca Court system and outlines the
Court’s formation, structure, and procedures. Part II discusses the
COURT (2009) [hereinafter “Ten Principles”]; TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF
TRUTH COMMISSIONS (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
21. See generally Ten Principles, supra note 20.
22. See LYAL SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 102–03 (1992).
23. See Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
69 (2003).
24. See id. at 78–81.
25. Ten Principles, supra note 20.
26. Anja Mihr & Chandra Lekha Sriram, Rule of Law, Security and Transitional
Justice in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Societies, at 2 (Comm’n on Glob. Sec. Just.
&
Gov.
Background
Paper
2015),
https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/Commission_BP_Mihr_Sriram.pdf.
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ECCC and analyzes the formation, structure, and procedures, while
comparing and contrasting them to the Gacaca Court. Part III details
the successes and failures of both court systems to evaluate if one
system is preferential to the other to forward transitional justice.
Finally, Part IV explains how those lessons can be applied in other
transitional justice systems.
I. RWANDA AND THE GACACA COURT
A. Formation
While the Gacaca Court was initially established in 2001 as a means
to mitigate the massive number of Rwandans accused of crimes that
forwarded the genocide in 1994, the history of the Gacaca is rooted
several hundreds of years prior. 27 During pre-colonial Rwanda in the
seventeenth century, Kings, known as Mwami, ruled various sectors
encompassing several households within an extended lineage. 28 The
Mwami embodied justice and power and, as such, were seen as the
ultimate judge, jury, and executioner. 29 However, before the Mwami
would hear any dispute, a group of wise men, referred to as the Gacaca,
would hear the matter first to restore peace and tranquility within
communities. 30 The Gacaca would recognize and acknowledge the
wrongs committed and summarily restored justice to the victims. 31
Once the colonization of Rwanda initiated, the western systems of law
and order engulfed the culture, and the newly established courts
eventually phased out the Gacaca as a means to settle disputes. 32
27. Maya Goldstein Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional
Justice, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 355, 375 (2004).
28. Bert Ingelaere, The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, in TRADITIONAL JUSTICE
AND RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENCE CONFLICT: LEARNING FROM AFRICAN
EXPERIENCES 25, 33 (2008).
29. Id.
30. Luc Huyse et al., Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent
Conflict, at 33, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE (2008),
https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/traditional-justice-andreconciliation-after-violent-conflict-learning-from-african-experiences_0.pdf. The
term “Gacaca” is derived from the Kinyarwanda word “unucaca,” meaning “a plant
so soft to sit on that people prefer to gather on it.” Id.
31. Id. at 33–34.
32. Id. at 34.
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At the conclusion of the Rwandan genocide, Rwanda’s
transitioning leaders faced the difficult position of having to prosecute
approximately 130,000 alleged participants of the genocide. 33 The
initial method to provide justice to the victims of the Rwandan genocide
was the creation of the ICTR. 34 However, given the vast amount of
accused, the ICTR needed a system to mitigate the insufficient
resources to establish First World courts as well as give local
communities closure and the ability to confront the trauma suffered
from the genocide. 35 The Gacaca court was re-implemented, like a
phoenix rising from the ashes of the Rwanda’s historic traditions and
culture. With the rebirth of the Gacaca system, several goals were
established within the Court’s implementation: “[1] establish truth
about what happened; [2] accelerate the legal proceedings for those
accused of genocide crimes; [3] eradicate the culture of impunity; [4]
reconcile Rwandans and reinforce their unity; and [5] use the capacities
of Rwandan society to deal with its problems through a justice-based
Rwandan custom.” 36
B. Structure
The Gacaca’s structure was based on a system of individual cells
and sectors. 37 Each individual cell makes up a small community, and a
small group of cells comprise a sector, which constitutes “a village.” 38
Within the dichotomy of the Gacaca system, there are 9,013 cells and
1,545 sectors, 39 comprising 12,013 individual Gacaca courts

33. Filip Reyntjens & Stef Vandegiste, Rwanda: An Atypical Transition, in
ROADS TO RECONCILIATION 110 (2005).
34. S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
35. See Outreach Programme On The Rwanda Genocide, Background
Information on the Justice and Reconciliation Process in Rwanda (Mar. 2014),
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgjustice.shtml (last visited
Mar. 25, 2018).
36. Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 38.
37. Alexandra A. Miller, From the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
to the International Criminal Court: Expanding the Definition of Genocide to Include
Rape, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 349, 352 n.29 (2003).
38. Id.
39. Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 41.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2017

7

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2017], Art. 6
Theiringcamera ready (Do Not Delete)

6/20/2018 11:11 AM

166 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
established nationwide as of April 2009.40 Gacaca court began as a
nineteen presiding judges, which make up the council, and has since
reduced to five elected judges known as Inyangamugayo. 41 During
2005 and 2006, data and information was collected from the accused in
all of the Gacaca cells. 42 After the initial data collection process was
complete, there were 818,564 Rwandans accused of some crime
relating to the genocide, of which 44,204 were not in the country, and
87,063 were deceased. 43
C. Categories of Crimes
At this stage, the Gacaca separated those accused into four distinct
categories: 1, 2 (1st and 2nd degree), 2 (3rd degree), and 3 (4th and 5th
degree). 44 These categories were generated to classify the accused into
distinct categories based on the severity of their alleged crime and
provide the Gacaca with sentencing guidelines. 45 The amount the
sentence could be decreased depended on whether the accused
confessed before or after they appeared on the list of suspects. 46
Category 1, the most severe, was reserved for those who “occupied
positions of leadership, rapists, well-known murderers, torturers, or any
people who committed dehumanizing acts on a body.” 47 Under this
category, due to the severity of the charges and punishments dispensed,
40. 1994 Genocide: Gacaca Trials Discharge One Million Cases So Far,
JUSTICE INFO.NET (Apr. 3, 2009), https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/component/k2/
21257-en-en-030409-rwandagenocide-1994-genocide-gacaca-trials-discharge-onemillion-cases-so-far1206412064.html.
41. Hollie Nyseth Brehm, Christopher Uggen, & Jean-Damascene Gasanabo,
Genocide, Justice, and Rwanda’s Courts, 30 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 333, 337
(2014); see also NICOLAS A. JONES, THE COURTS OF GENOCIDE: POLITICS AND THE
RULE OF LAW IN RWANDA AND ARUSHA (2010). The word “Inyangamugayo” is the
Kinyarwanda word for a reliable or trustworthy person. Id.
42. PHIL CLARK & ZACHARY D. KAUFMAN, AFTER GENOCIDE 13 (2008).
43. Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 42.
44. Id. at 40.
45. See id. at 39.
46. Anne N. Kubai, Between Justice and Reconciliation: The Survivors of
Rwanda, 16(1) AFR. SEC. REV. 53, 60 (2007).
47. Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 40; see also Anuradha Chakravarty, Gacaca
Courts in Rwanda: Explaining Divisions within the Human Rights Community, YALE
J. INT’L AFF. 134 (2006).
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those accused of Category 1 crimes would be addressed in either the
ordinary court or the ICTR. 48 Category 2 (1st and 2nd degree) was
reserved for “[o]rdinary killers in serious attacks and those who
committed attacks in order to kill but without attaining this goal.” 49 The
Sector Gacaca holds jurisdiction and could render a sentence ranging
from twenty to thirty years, with no confession, or from seven to twelve
years, with a confession prior to their appearance. 50 Category 2 (3rd
Degree) comprised of those who attacked others without the intention
to kill.51 The Sector Gacaca also addressed the accused in this category,
imposing a sentence of five to seven years, without a confession, or one
to three years, with a confession prior to their appearance. 52 Finally,
Category 3 (4th and 5th Degree) accused were charged with property
damage and were adjudicated by the Cell Gacaca, in which the only
punishment allowed—regardless of confession—was civil reparation. 53
After March 2007, the Categories were adjusted to allow the
Gacaca courts to generate judicial economy for the ICTR as well as gain
more closure for the victims of some of the most brutal atrocities.54
This was accomplished by shifting well-known murderers, torturers,
and those committing dehumanizing acts on a dead body to be tried
under what would now be deemed Category 2 (1st, 2nd, and 3rd
degree). 55 In addition, a new Category 2 (4th and 5th degree) replaced
the former Category 2 (1st and 2nd degree) category. 56 Furthermore, a
new Category 2 (6th degree) replaced the original Category 2 (3rd
degree). 57 Category 3 remained unaltered. 58 After all of the
48. Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 40; see also Chakravarty, supra note 47, at 134.
49. Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 40
50. L. Danielle Tully, Human Rights Compliance and the Gacaca Jurisdictions
in Rwanda, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 385, 400–01 (2003).
51. Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 40; see also Chakravarty, supra note 47, at 134.
52. Tully, supra note 50, at 400–01; see also Chakravarty, supra note 47, at
134.
53. Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 40.
54. Id. at 40–41, 43; see generally Leo C. Nwoye, Partners or Rivals in
Reconciliation? The ICTR and Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, 16 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
124 (2014).
55. Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 41.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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information was disseminated, it was determined Category 1 would
adjudicate over 77,269 accused, Category 2 contained 432,557, and
Category 3 was comprised of 308,739 accused. 59
D. Procedural Methods and Problems
Unlike the Gacaca proceedings during the time of the Mwami, the
new procedures embodied many attributes of Rwanda’s western
colonial influences. The Gacaca court of the past was focused on being
restorative and conciliatory, whereas the modern Gacaca was altered in
design and practice. 60 The alteration that has come about, aside from
the council of Inyangamugayo presiding over the court, is that much of
the subjective procedural methods utilized during the trial process are
not consistent with traditional Rwandan or international law. 61
For example, the accused do not have the right to counsel nor the
right to confront their accusers. 62 This aspect plays a significant role in
the Gacaca Court’s ability to collect evidence. During pre-trial, the
court is able to compile dossiers on the accused, including input from
the community. 63 The dossiers are then corroborated before their
introduction to the Gacaca. 64 Without a right to be present during the
pre-trial phase, coupled with the defendant’s lack of counsel, the trial
proceedings are heavily weighted against the accused. 65 However,
during the pre-trial phase, the accused are afforded a chance to put
59. Id. at 42.
60. Waldorf, supra note 8, at 50.
61. Chakravarty, supra note 47, at 132, 135.
62. Jennie E. Burnet, The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and
Revenge in Rwanda, 3 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 173, 176 (2008). Although
the Rwandan Constitution, the Rwandan Code of Criminal Procedure, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognize the accused’s “right to
be informed of the accusations against him or her and the right to have sufficient time
to prepare a defense,” Gacaca courts have not always respected those rights. Kenneth
Roth, Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda’s Community-Based Gacaca
RTS.
WATCH
(May
31,
2011),
Courts,
at
34,
HUM.
https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/05/31/justice-compromised/legacy-rwandascommunity-based-gacaca-courts.
63. Chakravarty, supra note 47, at 135.
64. Id.
65. Id.; see also Amnesty International, Rwanda: Gacaca—Gambling with
Justice (June 20, 2002), http://web.amnesty.org/library/ index/ENGAFR470032002.
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forward evidence to the community. 66 During this stage, “and even later
on in the information gathering period, witnesses are able to testify for
or against defendants.” 67
Once the trial is underway, the defendant is then informed of the
charges, and at such time, is allowed to present his case. 68 As a matter
of procedure, the council allows the defendant to provide additional
testimony if he feels the record is incomplete in some form.69
Furthermore, the defendant is allowed to challenge the category of the
crime of which he is accused. 70
However, many defendants do not challenge their category because
they have been accused of crimes they committed alongside family
members or close neighbors and do not want to point the finger at other
accused, which is required by the confession process. 71 During trial,
the council must discuss and analyze inconsistent testimonies from
primary suspects, accomplices, and witnesses, which can take up to
three years. 72 Additionally, the sentence may be appealed to a Gacaca
appeals court, “sometimes moving all the way up the national court
system.” 73

66. Chakravarty, supra note 47, at 135.
67. Id.; see also Jeevan Vasagar, Grassroots Justice, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 17,
2005,
9:18
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/mar/17
/worlddispatch.rwanda.
68. Roth, supra note 62, at 34. “[M]any accused did not receive the legally
prescribed notice of cases pending against them, were not provided with sufficient
pre-trial information about the charges against them, and were not given enough time
to prepare their defenses. Many accused only learned of the real nature of the
allegations against them on the day of their trial. The inability of the accused to
involve a lawyer only aggravated these problems.” Id.
69. Id.
70. Monitoring and Research Report on the Gacaca: Testimonies and Evidence
in the Gacaca Courts, at 32, PENAL REFORM INST., https://www.penalreform.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/Gacaca-Report-11-testimony-and-evidence-1.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 25, 2018).
71. Id.
72. Charlotte Hulme, The Truth Heals: Punishment and Reconciliation at
Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, at 10–11, Honor Thesis Collection (2014),
http://repository.wellesley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1250&context=thesiscoll
ection.
73. Id.
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Although these aspects of the Gacaca courts seem to be a proper
foundation for the establishment of a system rooted in transitional
justice, there are various critics that believe that the Gacaca courts are
stifling the progress of true transitional justice. Aside from the
previously mentioned deficiency in the lack of defendant’s rights,
allegations of corruption have been forwarded against the
Inyangamugayo. 74 Since the Inyangamugayo are unpaid, the incidents
of bribery and corruption have been a continued source of contention
for the Gacaca system as a whole. 75 As an extension of this concern,
the level of competency of those chosen as Inyangamugayo has been a
source of criticism of the Gacaca’s ability to dispense effective
justice. 76 The Inyangamugayo are not placed into their position for
their intricate level of knowledge in the law, but rather their status as
“people of integrity.” 77 Training for both the Inyangamugayo and the
“lawyers” within the Gacaca has been minimal at best. 78 As a
byproduct of the Inyangamugayo’s lack of payment and training, the
Office of the Prosecutor lends a disproportionate amount of support
towards the judiciary. 79 As a result, the prosecution has been given a
considerable amount of weight to their side, which creates an unlevel
playing field for those accused. 80
II. THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA
A. Formation
In 1997, “the former First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh and
then Second Prime Minister Hun Sen” of Cambodia appealed to the
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to establish a special
74. Rwanda: Mixed Legacy for Community-Based Genocide Courts, HUM. RTS.
WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/31/rwanda-mixed-legacy-communitybased-genocide-courts (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
75. Jacqueline Lewis, Mass Graves and a Thousand Hills: University Student
Perspectives on the Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda, at 5, INQUIRY J.
(2010).
76. Burnet, supra note 62, at 175.
77. Id.
78. Lewis, supra note 75, at 3.
79. Vasagar, supra note 67.
80. Id.
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tribunal in Cambodia. 81 The purpose of the tribunal was to bring justice
for the millions of individuals who suffered under the senior leadership
of the Khmer Rouge regime. 82 After several years of negotiations
between Cambodia and the United Nations, an agreement was
established on May 22, 2003, and was summarily endorsed by the
United Nations General Assembly. 83 With an agreement in place,
Cambodia established the Khmer Rouge Trial Task Force (“Task
Force”). 84 This Task Force created both legal and judicial institutions
to address the additional war criminals. 85 Meanwhile, the Cambodian
government stated it would only be able to contribute limited funding
because of its own deficient economic state and other prior
commitments. 86 As a result, several nations including, Canada, Japan,
and India all made significant contributions. 87 Despite the additional
contributions, as of January 2006, there was insufficient funding to
establish the tribunal. 88
Despite the lack of funding, two months later, United Nations
Secretary-General Kofi Annan nominated seven judges to the
81. Kathern M. Klein, Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice: The Challenges
and Risks Facing the Joint Tribunal in Cambodia, 4 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 549, 554
(2006). For the past 30 years, Hun Sen has served as Cambodia’s First Prime Minster
and has been able to keep his position even when the regime changed from King
Nordom Sihanouk to his son, and current King, Nordom Sihamoni. Stephanie Giry,
Autopsy of a Cambodia Election: How Hun Sen Rules, 94 FOREIGN AFF. 144, 146
(2015).
82. Daniel Kemper Donovan, Joint U.N.-Cambodia Efforts to Establish a
Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 551, 551 (2003).
83. See generally, G.A. Res. 57/228 B (May 22, 2003).
84. See Teresa V. Capeleto, Reconciliation in the Wake of Tragedy:
Cambodia’s Extraordinary Chambers Undermines the Cambodian Constitution, 17
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 103, 109 (2008).
85. Id.
86. See Alison Kamhi, Private Funding for Public Justice: The Feasibility of
Donations to the Cambodian Tribunal, 48 HARV. INT’L L. J. 581, 581–82 (2007).
87. Id. at 584. Nearly three dozen countries contributed to the formation of the
ECCC, including loans from the United Nations. For an exhaustive list of the countries
and the amounts they donated, see Documentation Center of Cambodia, List of
Pledging Donor Countries for U.N. Share for Establishment of Extraordinary
Chambers,
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/Financial_Outlook_31%20_January_%2
02015.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
88. Kamhi, supra note 86, at 584.
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tribunal. 89 As May 2006 approached, King Norodom Sihamoni
approved seventeen judges from Cambodia and thirteen international
officials to preside over the tribunals. 90 All of the chosen justices were
officially sworn in to serve on the tribunal in July 2006. 91 However,
over the following years, staff has worked without pay and has even
“gone on strike following severe funding shortfalls.” 92 As a result of
the lack of funding, the U.N. General Assembly has been forced to grant
the ECCC funding to ensure staff was paid. 93
B. Structure
Regarding the structure, the tribunal consisted of a combination of
local and international judges. 94 There are three separate chambers:
Pre-Trial Chamber, Trial Chamber, and the Supreme Court Chamber. 95
First, the Pre-Trial Chamber hears motions from Investigating Justices
89. Judges Nominated, THE PHNOM PENH POST. (Mar. 10, 2006, 7:00 AM),
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/judges-nominated.
90. King Approves List of Judges for KR Trial, THE CAMBODIA DAILY (May 9,
2006), https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/king-approves-list-of-judges-forkr-trial-54020/. The international officials included officials from Australia, Austria,
Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Poland, Sri Lanka, and the
United States.
91. Judges sworn in for Khmer Rouge, BBC NEWS (last updated July 3, 2006,
9:02 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5140032.stm.
92. Beth Van Schaack, The Building Blocks of Hybrid Justice, 44 DENV. J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 169, 276 (2016).
93. Id.; see also U.N. Secretary-General, Request for a Subvention to the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, U.N. Doc. A/69/536 (Oct. 20,
2014).
94. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea,
ECCC
(Oct.
27,
2004),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legaldocuments/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf [hereinafter Law on the
ECCC].
95. See Judicial Chambers, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF
CAMBODIA, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/organs/judicial-chambers (last visited Mar.
25, 2018). Both the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers are comprised of “three Cambodian
judges and two international judges;” whereas the Supreme Court Chamber contains
“four Cambodian judges and three international judges.” U.N. Secretary-General,
Report of the Secretary-General on Khmer Rouge Trials, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/57/769
(Mar. 31, 2003).
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who are assigned to cases with the specific purpose of determining if
the case will go to trial through the submission of a closing order. 96 If
the case moves forward, the Trial Chamber will hear and decide the
case. 97 Finally, the Supreme Court Chamber is able to hear appeals
from the Trial Chamber. 98 The Supreme Council of the Magistracy of
Cambodia determines the panel of international justices, which is
selected from a pool of nominations from the United Nations SecretaryGeneral. 99 The judges retain their appointments until the entire tribunal
has completed. 100
C. Administrative Divisions of the Court
1. Support for the Victims During the Process
Aside from actual litigation component of the tribunal, there is a
separate division within the ECCC dedicated specifically to address the
issues suffered by the Khmer Rouge’s victims. The Victims Support
Section (“VSS”) is an intermediary between the victims, or their
appointed representatives, and the ECCC. 101 Victims are provided a
variety of services and assistance from the VSS through different facets

96. Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE
COURT
OF
CAMBODIA,
https://web.archive.org/web/20110610105051/
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/ocij (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
97. Id.
98. Report of the Secretary-General on Khmer Rouge Trials, supra note 95, at
¶ 16; see also Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Internal Rules
(Rev. 1), Rule 23 (Feb. 1, 2008), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/
fileUpload/27/Internal_Rules_ Revision1_01-02-08_eng.pdf [hereinafter ECCC
Internal Rules].
99. Ernestine E. Meijer, The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for Prosecuting Crimes Committed by the Khmer Rouge: Jurisdiction,
Organization, and Procedure of an Internationalized National Tribunal, in
INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST
TIMOR, KOSOVO, & CAMBODIA 207, 221 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2004).
100. Id.
101. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), CTR.
FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY, http://cja.org/what-we-do/litigation/khmer-rougetrials/related-resources/the-extraordinary-chambers-in-the-courts-of-cambodiaeccc/?id=454 (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
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of the tribunal process. 102 For example, victims can gain support from
the VSS by directly becoming a part of the proceedings, whether it be
in the role of a complainant or a civil party. 103 In addition, the VSS is
charged with the duty of notifying victims about the rights they are
guaranteed during the tribunal as well as providing victims with legal
counsel if they require it. 104 Because of the functions of the VSS,
victims have been given formal recognition as a party to the
proceedings; thereby, becoming eligible for either individual or
collective damages caused by the genocide. 105 In addition to providing
logistical assistance, the VSS is charged with the security and
protection of all the participants during the course of the proceedings. 106
This can take two forms: (1) providing actual physical security for those
providing testimony to the ECCC or (2) counseling and psychiatric
care. 107 However, even in 2008, the ECCC “lacked even minimal
capacity to educate the public or to provide security or support to
victims and civil parties.” 108
2. Access to Legal Counsel for Defendants
Aside from the judiciary, there are several other departments within
the ECCC that seek to facilitate the processes of the tribunal and
provide direct support to certain areas within the trial process. One such
division of the ECCC is the Defense Support Section (“DSS”). The
DSS is responsible for several functions within the ECCC, which
include, providing indigent defendants with a choice of attorneys;
providing support services for the attorneys advocating for the defense;

102. Victims Support Section, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURT OF
CAMBODIA, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/victims-support (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Renee Jeffery, Beyond Repair?: Collective and Moral Reparations at the
Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 13 J. HUM. RTS. 103, 106 (2014).
106. James P. Bair, From the Numbers Who Died to Those Who Survived:
Victim Participation in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 31
U. HAW. L. REV. 507, 532 (2009).
107. See, e.g., ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 98, Rule 23.
108. Bair, supra note 106, at 532.
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and actively pursuing the continued usage of fair trial practices.109
Furthermore, the DSS acts as the voice within the media for those
accused. 110
Additionally, the DSS has an additional component known as the
Legacy Program. 111 The Legacy Program serves a two-fold purpose
within the structure of the ECCC. First, the Legacy Program is utilized
to further the understanding of individuals within Cambodia about the
criminal trial process as well as their right to a fair trial and defense.112
The second purpose is to give Cambodian judges and lawyers the
opportunity to obtain valuable exposure to international law. 113 The
intent of these goals is to foster an environment where concrete
improvements can be integrated within the Cambodian legal system;
thereby, expanding the Cambodian courts’ viability and capability to
address future concerns as they progress. 114
3. A Central Office that Provides Support and Stability
Finally, there is the Office of Administration contained within the
ECCC that handles a variety of day-to-day operations. 115 This includes
everything from budget and financing, to the Court Management Office
that provides audio, visual, and translation services, as well as a Public
Affairs Office. 116 All of these various offices and departments provide
the ECCC with the ability to provide support and modern legal services
109. See Defence Support Section (DSS), EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE
COURT OF CAMBODIA, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/organs/defence-support-section
(last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
110. Id.
111. Alice Murgier, The Legacy of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia: Why Defense Work is Essential in Shaping the Historical Narrative of
TRIBUNAL
MONITOR
(Sept.
16,
2016),
the
Court,
CAMBODIA
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/2016/09/16/the-legacy-of-the-eccc-why-defensework-is-essential-in-shaping-the-historical-narrative-of-the-court/.
112. See id.
113. See U.N. Off. of the High Comm., Promotion of ECCC Legacy (Sept. 28,
2015), http://cambodia.ohchr.org/en/rule-of-law/promotion-eccc-legacy.
114. Id.
115. Office of Administration, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURT OF
CAMBODIA, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/organs/office-administration (last visited
Mar. 25, 2018).
116. Id.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2017

17

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2017], Art. 6
Theiringcamera ready (Do Not Delete)

6/20/2018 11:11 AM

176 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
to maintain a solid working structure throughout the course of the
tribunal.
D. Procedural Methods
Turning towards the manner in which the ECCC dispenses justice,
we first look to the jurisdiction of the ECCC, and what crimes it is
charged with adjudicating. The ECCC currently retains jurisdiction
over several domestic and international crimes. 117 These include
crimes committed between 1975 and 1979 that violate the 1956 Penal
Code of Cambodia, 118 the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 119 the Geneva Conventions (war
crimes), 120 the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 121 the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, 122 and general crimes against humanity. 123 If
someone brought before the ECCC is found guilty, they can be
sentenced to imprisonment and additionally have their property
117. Law of ECCC, supra note 94.
118. Id. art. 3.
119. Id. art. 4. See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Punishment and Prevention
of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, S. Exec. Doc. O, 81-1, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
120. Law of ECCC, supra note 94, art. 6. See, e.g., Geneva Convention (I) for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6. U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention (II) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
121. Law of ECCC, supra note 94, art. 7. See, e.g., Hague Convention on the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249
U.N.T.S. 240.
122. Law of ECCC, supra note 94, art. 8. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
123. Law of ECCC, supra note 94, art. 5. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. Crimes against
humanity are specific “acts [] committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” Id. These
crimes include, inter alia, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible
transfer of population, imprisonment, torture, rape, enforced disappearance, apartheid,
and “other inhuman acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering,
or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” Id.
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forfeited. 124 Furthermore, in keeping with international humanitarian
law and the tradition of other United Nations tribunals, the ECCC lacks
the ability to impose the death penalty on any perpetrator no matter how
egregious the crimes may be. 125 As of November 2009, the ECCC had
only indicted five people, three of whom were convicted and awarded
life sentences. 126
1. Role of the Victim
During the course of the proceedings within the ECCC, the role of
the victim is crucial. 127 A victim is:
defined as any person or legal entity who has suffered from physical,
psychological, or material harm as a direct consequence of the crimes
committed in Cambodia by the Democratic Kampuchea regime
between April 17, 1975, and January 6, 1979, that are under the
jurisdiction of the ECCC. 128

124. Law of ECCC, supra note 94, art. 39.
125. Seth Mydans, Khmer Rouge Tribunal Enters Final Phase, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/24/world/asia/24cambo.html.
126. Id. In total the ECCC has adjudicated Case 001, Case 002, and Cases 003
and 004. For a brief overview of each of the cases see, ECCC at a Glance,
EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA (Apr. 2014),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/ECCC%20at%20a%20Glance%20%20EN%20-%20April%202014_FINAL.pdf.
127. See Victims Support Section, supra note 102. Victims have the
fundamental role of submitting complaints to Co-Prosecutors, “who take the interests
of Victims into account when considering whether to initiate an investigation or a
prosecution.” Id. Victims also have the ability to join Civil Parties and seek collective
and moral reparations. Id.
128. Victims Participation, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURT OF
CAMBODIA, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/victims-support/participation (last visited
Mar. 25, 2018). “Anyone who has suffered from physical, psychological, or material
harm as a direct consequence of the crimes committed in Cambodia by the Democratic
Kampuchea regime between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979 is considered to be a
Victim by the ECCC. For example: if you were detained or tortured; if you suffered
from forced starvation; if you were forced to leave your home and to work hard labor
against your will; if your parents, grandparents, or other family members were killed,
abducted, detained, or tortured; if you lost your house, your rice fields, your animals,
or other property, you may be considered a Victim.” Id.
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One reason behind the necessity of the victim’s role during the process
is based upon the concept that the ECCC is an important vehicle for
those affected by the genocide to come to terms with the traumatic
events they endured from the atrocities the Khmer Rouge committed.129
Neth Pheaktra, an ECCC spokesperson, emphasized the importance of
the ECCC for the victims stating, “The tribunal facilitates reconciliation
and at the same time provides an opportunity for Cambodians to come
to terms with their history.” 130
2. Rights Granted to the Accused
The procedure that the ECCC follows during the course of the trial
is all delineated and dictated by the Internal Rules of the ECCC. Unlike
the Gacaca courts of Rwanda, the ECCC is grounded in the tenets of
international law and, therefore, the rights of the accused are factored
into procedure far more heavily. 131 Aside from the accused having a
right to counsel, the Internal Rules provide guidance for the accused to
have the right to be informed of their charges, the right to confront and
question their accusers, a set time for the accused to prepare their case,
and provisions against unwarranted searches and seizures. 132
Furthermore, “[G]acaca courts have no procedures governing what
evidence is admissible or inadmissible, who has the burden of proving
that a person committed a crime, and what standard should be used to
determine guilt.” 133 Within the Internal Rules for the ECCC, there are
specific rules for the intake of evidence. 134 Additionally, the judiciary

129. See Isabelle Chan, Rethinking Transitional Justice: Cambodia, Genocide,
and a Victim-Centered Model, INT’L STUD. HON. PROJ. 3, 30 (2006).
130. Sun Narin, No justice without remembering, DEV. & COOPERATION (Mar.
4,
2017),
https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/legacy-khmer-rouge-still-hauntscambodia.
131. Michael G. Karnavas, Bringing Domestic Cambodian Cases Into
Compliance With International Standards, 1 CAMBODIA L. & POL’Y J. 45, 47 (2014).
132. See ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 98.
133. Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda’s Community-Based
RTS.
WATCH
(May
31,
2011),
Gacaca
Courts,
HUM.
https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/05/31/justice-compromised/legacy-rwandascommunity-based-gacaca-courts.
134. ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 98, Rule 87.
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is able to reject evidence for being irrelevant or repetitious, or being
impossible to obtain within a reasonable time. 135
However, one of the most stark and striking differences between
the Gacaca courts and the ECCC within procedure is the manner in
which judiciary matters are conducted. Unlike the Gacaca courts,
which rely on having a judiciary comprised solely of individuals from
the community at large, 136 the ECCC judiciary is a combination of
Cambodian and international judges that were nominated by the United
Nations Secretary-General, and approved by the Cambodian Supreme
Council of the Magistracy. 137 This method was created so the judiciary
would have less personal attachment to the cases and the ability to focus
solely on the law. 138 Furthermore, the ECCC appeal process is more
traditional than the Gacaca court. Within the ECCC process, there are
only two grounds for appeal to the Supreme Court Chamber: “an error
on a question of law invalidating the judgment or decision, or an error
of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.” 139
3. Deficiencies of the ECCC
Although the ECCC may be rooted in international law, and have
more provisions preventing corruption and protecting the accused, the
process has still faced criticism from the international community.140
First, there have been significant criticisms in how Cases 003 and 004
were completed. Case 003 involves the actions of the former Khmer
Rouge army commanders Meas Muth and Sou Met who allegedly were
involved in the supervision of transportations, and subsequent arrests of
prisoners to the S-21 prison. 141 The controversy within this case arose

135. Id.
136. Chakravarty, supra note 47, at 132.
137. Int’l Bar Ass’n, Safeguarding Judicial Independence in Mixed Tribunals,
at 19 (Sept. 2011), https://law.vanderbilt.edu/files/archive/Cambodia-report-(Sept2011).pdf.
138. See id. at 13.
139. Id. at 71. Additionally, a decision made within the Chamber’s discretion
may be subject to immediate appeal if the decision was based on a “discernable error,”
resulting in prejudice to the appellant. Id.
140. Id.
141. Open Soc’y Just. Initiative, Recent Developments at the Extraordinary
Chambers
in
the
Courts
of
Cambodia,
at
15
(June
2011),
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when Andrew Cayley, the International Co-Prosecutor in the case,
openly challenged the Co-Investigating Judges for the premature
dismissal of the case insinuating that they were attempting to “bury” the
case. 142 In addition to Mr. Cayley’s statement, multiple judges resigned
from their positions in what seemed to be a response to the actions taken
regarding Case 003 and Case 004. 143 Significantly, in October 2011,
German Co-Investigating Judge Siegfried Blunk resigned over the
Cambodian government’s remarks opposing further prosecutions
within these cases because it was “undermining his position and calling
into doubt his ability to act independently.” 144
Not long after the resignation of Justice Blunk, Swiss Judge
Laurent Kasper-Ansermet resigned unexpectedly as well. 145 This
casted even more doubt on the courts independent ability to investigate
and pursue charges against aging and ailing Khmer Rouge leaders. 146
Specifically, Case 004 involved three mid-level Khmer Rouge
commanders: Im Chaem, Ta Ann, and Ta Tith. 147 These three
commanders were in charge of a forced labor camp, which forced
people to create a massive irrigation project, and oversaw massacres of
workers within the camp. 148 Since the events of the Khmer Rouge, Ta
Tith has established himself in Cambodia as a successful entrepreneur,
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/cambodia-eccc20110614.pdf.
142. Sovan My, Cambodia war crimes judge threatens suit against prosecutor,
LEARNING-TEACHING SOURCES (May 13, 2011), http://ltsources.blogspot.com/
2011/05/cambodia-war-crimes-judge-threatens.html.
143. Judge Resigns KR Court Over Gov’t Pressure, THE CAMBODIA DAILY
(Oct. 11, 2011), https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/judge-resigns-kr-courtover-govt-pressure-104822/; see also Press Release by the International CoInvestigating Judge, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA,
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/press-release-international-reserve-coinvestigating-judge (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
144. Tallyn Gray, Comment, Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Trials in 2012
in review: Will the Court survive 2013?, 2 WESTMINSTER L. REV. (2012).
145. Press Release by the International Co-Investigating Judge, supra note
143.
146. Id.
147. Jared Ferrie, Khmer Rouge crimes in legal limbo, THE NATIONAL (last
updated July 24, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.thenational.ae/world/southeastasia/khmer-rouge-crimes-in-legal-limbo?pageCount=0.
148. Id.
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and Im Chaem can now be found in Cambodia’s Anlong Veng District
as a commune chief, which adds more foundation for concerns of
political pressure to drop the charges or suspend their hearings. 149
Additional criticisms have been raised over the financial aspects of
the ECCC. From 2006 to 2016, $293 million dollars were spent on the
ECCC, with Cambodia contributing approximately $41.5 million
dollars (approximately 14% of the total finances). 150 The United
Nations contributed the remaining $251.5 million. 151 This disparity
continued to be apparent when analyzing the financial contributions
made in certain years. By 2014, one case had come to full term, but the
international community had expended over $200 million on the
ECCC.152 Additionally, the international community has accused the
Cambodian government of withholding funding to prevent prosecuting
of more Khmer Rouge Leaders. 153 In fact, government workers, who
are supposed to be paid by the Cambodian government, have repeatedly
requested their salaries to be paid and went on strike in 2013. 154
Neither the Gacaca nor the ECCC are infallible. However, to
determine if either of these courts are providing and fostering
transitional justice, the successes and the failures of both courts must
be examined.

149.
150.

Id.
ECCC Financial Outlook as of 31 October 2017, EXTRAORDINARY
CHAMBER
IN
THE
COURTS
OF
CAMBODIA,
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/ECCC%20Contribution%20Data%20as
%20at%2031%20October%202017.pdf (Cambodia is the second largest contributor
to the ECCC behind Japan’s $69.8 million contribution).
151. Id.
152. Charlie Campbell, Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Trials Are a Shocking
Failure, TIME (Feb. 13, 2014), http://time.com/6997/cambodias-khmer-rouge-trialsare-a-shocking-failure/.
153. Cambodia: Government Obstructs Khmer Rouge Court, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Sept. 5, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/print/250989.
154. Id.
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III. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE GACACA AND THE
EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBER IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA.
A. Success of the Gacaca Court
When analyzing the successes and failures of the Gacaca and the
ECCC we must bear in mind that the focus of analysis is which system
best forwards the tenets of transitional justice. The four tenets of
transitional justice, as established in international human rights law,
are:
[1] the State obligation to investigate and prosecute alleged
perpetrators of gross violations of human rights and serious
violations of international humanitarian law, including sexual
violence, and to punish those found guilty; [2] the right to know the
truth about past abuses and the fate of disappeared persons; [3] the
right to reparations for victims of gross violations of human rights
and serious violations of international humanitarian law; and [4] the
State obligation to prevent, through different measures, the
reoccurrence of such atrocities in the future. 155

Within the Gacaca system, there has been some notable success in
the Rwandan people’s ability to create positive working steps towards
healing and reconciliation. Many in Rwanda have expressed the
Gacaca has allowed communities to move forward not only through the
process of bringing perpetrators to justice, 156 but has allowed families
to discover the truth behind their loved ones’ deaths. 157 Through this
process, the environment for transition and reconciliation is developed
as it allows victims to learn the truth about what happened to their loved
ones, provides a sense of closure, and allows perpetrators to have the
ability to confess their crimes, which leads to healing and transition.158
Furthermore, the Gacaca, regardless of the critiques, has been able to
provide Rwandans the ability to adjudicate far more accused.
155. Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, at 5, U.N.
Doc. HR/PUB/13/5 (2014).
156. See Gabisirege, S. & Babalola, S., Perceptions About the Gacaca Law in
Rwanda: Evidence from a Multi-Method Study, Rwanda Ministry of Justice (Apr.
2001), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACN606.pdf.
157. See Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide, supra note 35.
158. Id.
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B. Success of the Extraordinary Chambers
Although there have been a host of critiques and issues with the
results of the ECCC since its inception, there have been some
noteworthy successes generated from the existence of the ECCC. One
such success is the ECCC created a common history of the atrocities in
Cambodia. However, scholars have noted many individuals within
Cambodia are unaware of the extent of the Khmer Rouge’s atrocities. 159
This unawareness is a result of the research conducted, which was taken
by non-Cambodians using English and, therefore, not accessible to
most Cambodian people. 160 This unawareness is exacerbated because,
since 1999, Cambodian schools have not taught the history of the
Khmer Rouge. 161
Through the transparency the ECCC provides, the people of
Cambodia are able to hear first-hand from those involved, exactly what
took place during the Khmer Rouge’s regime. From 2009 to 2014,
between live and video mediums, over 390,000 people have viewed the
proceedings of the ECCC. 162 This display of interaction with the
general populous furthers the ability of the ECCC to reach the
Cambodian people in a manner that will allow them to assimilate and
acknowledge the information about the dark time in their history.
Similar to the Gacaca, this allows the people to be directly involved.
Another success is the ability to end impunity within Cambodia.
Even though only five indictments have resulted from the ECCC
proceedings, the ECCC has created an opportunity for the Cambodian
people to hold some perpetrators accountable for the gross human rights
violations. 163 However, one of the strongest successes is the ability to

159. Melanie Klinkner, Forensic Science for Cambodian Justice, 2 INT’L J.
TRANSNAT’L JUST. 227, 238, 241–42 (2008).
160. Id. at 238.
161. See Erika Kinetz, In Cambodia, a Clash Over History of the Khmer Rouge,
POST
(May
8,
2007)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpWASH.
dyn/content/article/2007/05/07/AR2007050701870.html.
162. See ECCC at a Glance, supra note 126.
163. See Mary Wood, Tribunal for Khmer Rouge War Criminals May Be Last
Chance to End Cambodia’s “Culture of Impunity,” U. VA. SCH. LAW (Apr. 7, 2004),
http://content.law.virginia.edu/news/2004_spr/cambodia.htm.
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develop and foster a culture of the rule of law. 164 The ECCC has
provided training through the Legacy Program and the training of
Cambodian lawyers by the ECCC. 165 These efforts have fostered an
environment of knowledge sharing in which various projects and nongovernmental organizations have traveled to Cambodia to impart their
legal knowledge to the legal staff in Cambodia. 166 Through this
practice and training, the culture of law can expand as the torch of legal
knowledge is spread like wildfire throughout the legal community in
Cambodia which effects not just structural but transitional justice
changes as well.
C. Failures of the Gacaca Court
Turning towards the other side of the coin, we must analyze the
failures of both courts to properly ascertain their place in forwarding
transitional justice. The massive lack of rights for the accused and the
structural deficiencies within the Gacaca system lead to increased
chances for corruption, which increases the possibility of impeding
transitional justice. Additionally, the Gacaca courts have been shown
to have a 20% acquittal rate. 167 Analysts assert this rate is an indicator
the cases that are presented to the Gacaca are not well structured,
potentially allowing those that have committed atrocities to go free.168
Further, since the Gacaca courts do not rely on traditional evidence and
primarily on witness testimony, the duration from the alleged crime to
the subsequent trial may skew a witness’s memory; thus, possibly
skewing the entire trial process. 169
Another failure scholars have noted is the government’s decision to
decline prosecuting soldiers of the current ruling party, the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (“RPF”). 170 The RPF soldiers that ended the genocide
164. Helen Horsington, The Cambodian Khmer Rouge Tribunal: The Promise
of a Hybrid Tribunal, 5 MELB. J. INT’L L. 462, 480 (2004).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Vasagar, supra note 67.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Rwanda: Justice After Genocide – 20 Years On, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar.
28, 2014, 6:02 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/28/rwanda-justice-aftergenocide-20-years.
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in July 1994 killed thousands of combatants and non-combatants. 171
However, the law was amended in 2004 to exclude these crimes from
being discussed within the Gacaca proceedings. 172 As a result, longterm reconciliation will be impaired until the Rwandan government
provides the Gacaca court the ability to openly discuss the entire history
of atrocities.
D. Failures of the Extraordinary Chambers
Turning towards the ECCC, the major failures that are most notably
critiqued are the egregiously slow process of indicting, convicting only
five offenders through the process as well as the fear that the
Cambodian government determines who will be tried. 173 Looking at
these failures through the transitional justice lens, if the path to
transitional justice is to allow individual closure and healing, the
Cambodian government cannot inject its will into the proceedings of
the ECCC. Given the underdeveloped ability to reach low-level
offenders, the ECCC is not satisfying the tenant of direct justice to the
Cambodian people. Although the foundation of the ECCC is built upon
the strength of international law, if that law is not being effectuated in
a manner that provides closure or unity to the Cambodian people in their
reconciliation, then the benefits of transitional justice will be stifled.
IV. APPLICATION FOR FUTURE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS
After analyzing all the factors between the Gacaca and ECCC the
question then must be asked, which system is a better model in
forwarding transitional justice? This answer directly depends on what
the state and victims need. If we are seeking a transitional justice
system that focuses on justice, then we analyze which system has
brought more accused to justice or punishment for their crimes,
171.
The
Rwandan
Patriotic
Front,
HUM. RTS.
WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-03.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2018).
172. Rwanda: Mixed Legacy for Community-Based Genocide Courts, supra
note 74.
173. See generally Tom Fawthrop, Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Tribunal:
DIPLOMAT
(July
17,
2017),
Mission
Accomplished?,
THE
https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/cambodias-khmer-rouge-tribunal-missionaccomplished/.
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allowing victims to gain closure. Given the simple fact that the ECCC
has only indicted and convicted five people, while the Gacaca has heard
1.2 million cases throughout 12,000 community-based courts, on paper
the Gacaca claims victory. 174 However, this focus almost becomes a
numbers game, the more trials, the more accused being punished, the
more justice dispensed, which is not always inherently true.
When we turn to the peace side of the dichotomy the discussion
becomes more convoluted. When looking at transitional justice in this
instance, we are not just looking at the healing and reconciliation of the
communities at large, 175 but rather the impact of lasting peace with the
Both the Rwandan and Cambodian
transitioning regime. 176
government in some manner have instituted a policy or action that calls
into question the legitimacy of true reconciliation and development of
closure. Both governments have created amnesties, which prevent the
court from punishing certain groups. At the point that takes place, true
peace through transitional reconciliation is limited because the essence
of healing and peace requires full disclosure and admittance. Since both
systems can be shown to have taken a stance of interjection through the
government, we must look to other factors to ascertain an answer.
One of the largest differences between the Gacaca and ECCC is
that the ECCC has developed a firm foundation for advocating victims’
rights against perpetrators in both a criminal and civil manner. The most
significant difference is that the healing and peace is not just generated
from the testimony presented by those on trial, or the victims sharing
their sorrow, but the support provided during and after the trial via the
VSS. 177 Both the Gacaca and ECCC allow victims and accused to share
and testify their experiences to gain closure or reconciliation.
However, the ECCC is the only model that provides counseling and
psychological support to victims dealing with the difficult process.
Although truth can bring some closure, the price of that truth can come
174. Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide, supra note 35.
175. David Mendeloff, Trauma and Vengeance: Assessing the Psychological
and Emotional Effects of Post-Conflict Justice, 31(3) HUM. RTS. Q. 592, 593 (2009).
176. See Cyanne E. Loyle, Transitional Injustice: Subverting Justice in
Transition and Postconflict Societies, 15 J. HUM. RTS. 126 (2016).
177. See Laura McGrew, Performance and Perception: The Impact of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, OPEN SOC’Y JUST. INITIATIVE
(2016),
http://www.academia.edu/27794266/Performance_and_Perception_
The_impact_of_the_Extraordinary_Chambers_in_the_Courts_of_Cambodia.
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with injuries that will require a lifetime of mental support and care. The
ECCC has at least established the proper foundation to provide victims
with the tools necessary to take what they hear at the proceedings and
cope properly with professional help along the way. Just hearing words
is not enough, true peace requires the ability to understand how to deal
with the emotional struggle, and channel that pain in a positive manner.
Although the quantity is clearly in the Gacaca’s favor, the ECCC
provides more resources to forward the process with the support
necessary to make effective transitional change.
CONCLUSION
Although Depeche Mode’s “The Policy of Truth,” mentioned at the
beginning of this Article was not singing about either the atrocities in
Rwanda or Cambodia, there are messages in the single that reflect the
process both nations have devised to reconcile very dark times in their
history. “Never again is what you swore the time before.” 178 After the
Holocaust, the mantra regarding genocide became “Never Again.” Yet,
the world has suffered genocide after genocide since the closure of
those concentration camps. Depeche Mode also said, “[Y]ou will see
your problems multiply, if you continually decide to faithfully pursue
the policy of truth.” 179 Both the Gacaca and ECCC have created their
own host of critiques and problems. Nevertheless, both systems have
recognized some of their structural and practical issues. The ECCC,
although lacking in numbers of those indicted, has made headway in a
variety of facets reconciling individual victims in Cambodia. Through
victim support, production of a legal culture rooted in international law,
and establishment of a common history, the ECCC has given people a
means to begin to recognize and transition from the days of the Khmer
Rouge.
For the accused who testify, “[I]t’s too late to change events, it’s
time to face the consequence for delivering the proof in the policy of
truth.” 180 This is the essence of what transitional justice is. Recognizing
and accepting past atrocities is critical for the community and nation as
a whole to heal and move forward. Both systems have forwarded this

178.
179.
180.

Policy Of Truth, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
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concept to some extent. Each system reveals how the international
community can support both victims and governments. Through this,
we can finally help those affected by the tragedy of genocide and war
crimes by instituting the best institutions that allow healing, peaceful
transition, and reconciliation.
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